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ABSTRACT
This article examines the use of Forced Marriage Protection Orders 
(FMPOs) in England and Wales to determine which framing narra-
tives affect the outcomes of FMPO cases. Forced marriage is mar-
riage without the consent of one or both parties and is legally 
recognised as a form of domestic violence in the UK that primarily 
affects women and girls; FMPOs are civil injunctions designed to 
prevent forced marriage and protect its victims. Although approxi-
mately 200–250 FMPOs have been granted annually across 
Northern Ireland, England and Wales since 2014, little is known 
about how the legislation functions. This study used a qualitative 
socio-legal approach to understand the application and interpreta-
tion of the law and the broader socio-political context that shapes 
this process. It analysed 33 FMPO-related judgements, finding that 
perceptions of culture, consent, disability and victim credibility 
influenced how evidence was interpreted and how forced marriage 
was constructed. It also examined case outcomes and found that 
FMPOs were breached in a substantial minority of cases and that 
victims with disabilities faced significant barriers to justice. The 
study makes a number of recommendations to ensure that 
FMPOs can function effectively, such as providing training for 
judges and legal personnel and offering greater witness support.
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Introduction
A forced marriage is a marriage that takes place without the consent of one or both 
parties: it includes child marriage as, by definition, children cannot give informed 
consent (Anitha and Gill 2009). Forced marriage is a serious violation of an individual’s 
human rights, including the right not to marry; when it happens to children, it constitutes 
a form of child abuse (Gill and Gould 2020). It places victims at risk of honour killings 
and commonly leads to a range of serious and enduring harms, including abduction, 
domestic violence, rape, forced pregnancy and domestic servitude (Anitha and Gill 2015; 
Gangoli 2011, Gill and Walker 2020).
The policy documents are careful to distinguish between arranged marriages (consen-
sual) and marriages that are forced or coerced (Foreign and Commonwealth Office and 
Simmonds, M. 2013, Forced Marriage Unit statistics 2018 2019). However, most aca-
demics acknowledge that, in reality, there is a spectrum of levels of pressure or coercion in 
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relation to marriage (Anitha and Gill 2009; Enright 2009, Gill and Gould 2020) ranging 
from physical violence to parental/cultural expectations that children will marry by 
a certain age that may make young people compliant against their wishes.
Forced marriage is often framed as a cultural problem (Gangoli 2011) or ‘harmful 
traditional practice’. This contributes to the narrative that certain cultures and 
places need to ‘modernise’ or develop in order to eradicate forced marriage. 
However, feminist academics and activists have argued that the practice can also 
be viewed as a form of domestic or gender-based violence (Anitha and Gill 2009: 
Gangoli 2011, Gill and Anitha 2011, Chantler 2012, Yurdakul and Korteweg 2013): 
in other words, forced marriage can be seen as part of broader patriarchal patterns 
of coercion and control (Anitha and Gill 2009). Considering forced marriage as 
related to forms of violence and coercion that are not commonly interpreted as 
purely ‘cultural’ sheds new light on why forced marriages happen and how they can 
be prevented (Gill and Gould 2020).
The UK Government’s Forced Marriage Unit (FMU) has supported 1200–1400 forced 
marriage victims and people at risk of forced marriage each year since 2011. This is likely an 
underestimate, as many people forced into marriage do not, or cannot, contact the 
authorities. In the UK, forced marriage primarily affects women and girls from particular 
Black and minority ethnic (BME) communities; the majority are of South Asian origin, with 
a substantial minority being of Middle Eastern origin (FMU 2018). This crime is highly 
gendered, with a majority of cases involving women and girls (75% in 2018), while about 5% 
of cases (5.3% in 2018) involve people with disabilities. Victims are generally young, with the 
highest numbers in the under-15 (17.7% in 2018) and 18–21 age groups (17.4% in 2018).
Forced Marriage Protection Orders (FMPOs) are a form of civil injunctions first 
introduced in 2007 with the Forced Marriage (Civil Protection) Act 2007, which 
applies to Northern Ireland, England and Wales; the Forced Marriage (Protection 
and Jurisdiction) (Scotland) Act came into force in 2011. Before the introduction of 
these laws, activists and advocates from communities particularly affected by forced 
marriage strongly recommended civil forms of protection, rather than criminal sanc-
tions, as the best way to tackle the issue (Patel 2008, Gill and Anitha 2011, Asokla 
2018). They argued that many victims would be reluctant to see their families prose-
cuted, resulting in fewer people seeking help, and that this would be exacerbated by the 
introduction of any law that would allow the police to press charges without the 
agreement of the person at risk (Gill and Anitha 2011; Askola 2018). However, 
following concerns that FMPOs might not be entirely effective due to regular breaches, 
forced marriage was criminalised in Scotland, England and Wales in 2014 and in 2015 
for Northern Ireland.
The focus of this paper is on FMPOs. Although approximately 200–250 FMPOs have 
been granted each year across Northern Ireland, England and Wales since 2014, little is 
known about how the legislation is functioning. Based on an analysis of reported court 
case judgements on FMPOs, this article investigates key themes that emerge from these 
judgements to understand prevailing legal constructions of forced marriage, and the 
efficacy of existing remedies.
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Methods
Analysing case law can demonstrate whether a law is functioning well in practice 
and identify any procedural issues. However, analysis of reported case law does have 
limitations. These cases are often more complex than others or have some novel 
aspect; indeed, they are reported specifically because they set a precedent. As 
a result, the sample investigated here may not represent the range of cases brought 
before the courts. Nonetheless, as the judgements from cases that proceed to higher 
courts offer a unique insight into the workings of the law, the sample is particularly 
well suited to the purposes of this study.
Research focusing on judgements often takes a doctrinal approach by first out-
lining the law pertaining to a certain issue: ‘the primary or even sole aim is to 
describe a body of the law and how it applies’ (Dobinson and Johns 2007, p. 21). 
Other studies employ ‘problem, policy and law reform’ methods; analysis focuses on 
a particular problem and its influence on the law in order to recommend legislative 
development and improvements (Dobinson and Johns 2007). This study falls within 
the category of socio-legal research (Dobinson and Johns 2007), as it examines the 
influence of society on law (and the converse) rather than undertaking a strictly 
legal analysis. The approach is grounded in the feminist tradition, which seeks to 
scrutinise judgements in order to identify the ‘social facts’ (Hunter 2015) – under-
lying assumptions that are accepted as common knowledge and therefore not 
substantiated – that underpin these judgements (Burns 2012). These assumptions 
often encode existing social hierarchies and the forms of discrimination that arise as 
a consequence (Hunter 2015).
Data collection and analysis
Judgement searches were undertaken, using the search term ‘Forced Marriage 
Protection Orders’, in the 2010–2020 case law and law report sections of four 
legal databases: BAILII, Westlaw, Lawtel, and Lexis Library. Duplicates and judge-
ments that only referred to forced marriage in passing were removed, resulting 
in a sample of 33 judgements on cases that had a substantial focus on 
FMPOs: 30 from England and Wales, two from Northern Ireland and one from 
Scotland.
Qualitative thematic analysis was used to identify patterns across the judge-
ments, then group these patterns into key themes. Thematic analysis was also used 
to identify differences across the sample. All judgements were read closely, and 
a coding framework was then developed based on the research aims and questions. 
QSR NVivo 12 was used to code each judgement iteratively, with further codes 
identified during the coding process as new themes emerged.
Research findings
The first section below outlines factors that lead to forced marriage and co- 
occurring forms of violence, as gleaned from the judgements. Subsequent sections 
analyse the key themes that emerged from the judgements, including how 
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perceptions of culture, consent, disability, and victim credibility shape interpreta-
tions of evidence and constructions of forced marriage. Finally, the paper exam-
ines case outcomes, including the kinds of orders made, as well as examples of 
breaches of FMPOs.
Factors leading to forced marriage
This section explores the factors that often lead to forced marriage, including co- 
occurring forms of violence in families, such as domestic violence and child abuse. 
Although forced marriage is often viewed through a cultural lens, the sample 
demonstrates the significant overlap and commonalities with other forms of family 
violence.
Physical abuse was the most common co-occurring type of violence, being 
mentioned in 15 out of the 33 cases: nine cases involved both domestic violence 
against the mother of the subject of FMPO and physical abuse of the children in the 
family, while six involved historic and ongoing child abuse/neglect. The different 
varieties and forms of violence identified in the judgements is best understood in 
the context of a continuum of violence (Kelly 1988, Gangoli 2011). While forms of 
abuse such as physical violence, emotional abuse and sexual violence may seem 
discrete, they often co-occur: ‘forms of sexual violence shade into each other at 
various points’ (Kelly 1988, p. 67), as do child abuse and domestic violence against 
the mother.
There has been greater recognition in recent years that children are affected by 
living in households in which domestic violence takes place: they are more likely to 
be physically abused themselves, while witnessing domestic violence has deleterious 
effects on their development. Multiple forms of abuse, maltreatment, and victimisa-
tion affect a significant minority of children and are associated with higher rates of 
trauma and other mental health issues. According to Wolfe (2018, p.833; also see 
Price-Robertson et al. 2014), ‘children who experience one type of violence are more 
likely than not to have experienced (or will experience) others’. As a result, Wolfe 
argues that, excepting work on single-event experiences of violence, victimisation 
should generally be viewed as ‘an ebb and flow of negative events that creates 
a lifelong burden’ (Price-Robertson et al. 2013, p. 833). Multiple traumas result in 
an overload for children, resulting in difficulties in ‘adapting’ to these events (Wolfe 
2018).
As a result, 10 of the children and young adults (from eight cases) discussed in 
the judgements demonstrated externalising and internalising behaviours, including 
violence, trouble at school, truancy, aggression towards siblings, harmful sexual 
behaviours, suicidal ideation and/or suicide attempts; this pattern of difficulties 
was similar to the ‘developmental consequences of victimisation’ (Musicaro et al. 
2019, p.83–84) displayed by other groups of young people experiencing victimisa-
tion. However, the ‘bad behaviour’ (e.g. entering into a sexual relationship with 
a consenting partner) identified by parents in the judgements was often used as 
a further justification for parental attempts to force children and young people to 
marry.
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These findings support feminist theories that forced marriage should be viewed as 
a form of domestic violence and that, like other forms of domestic violence, it is 
linked to historically and culturally specific manifestations of patriarchy. By con-
trast, explanations that view forced marriage primarily as a cultural phenomenon 
neglect to identify major commonalities between this and other manifestations of 
patriarchal violence and coercive control.
Formulations of consent and coercion
This section explores the various ways consent was constructed and conceptualised in the 
judgements. Judges’ definitions of forced marriage and arranged marriage varied across 
the sample, though most demonstrated an understanding of arranged marriage and 
forced marriage as existing on a spectrum. Elsewhere, the authors have argued that 
‘consent is often constructed in the context of power imbalances and gendered norms, 
and, crucially, often in the absence of explicit threats’ (Anitha and Gill, 2011, p.54).
The standard of proof in civil courts is based on ‘the balance of probabilities’, which is 
easier to meet than the criminal standard (i.e. ‘beyond reasonable doubt’). Victims 
applying to civil courts need to prove that their claims are more likely true than not in 
order to receive a protective injunction. Thus the onus is on the claimant to prove claims 
about coercion. In more than half of the 33 cases, high levels of evidence were required to 
recognise marriages as forced. A more specific breakdown of these cases is given in the 
analyses below.
The way the judges discussed consent in relation to forced marriage and sexual 
assault was not affirmative (i.e. based on clear indications of willingness) and did 
not often take into account the context in which the choice to marry was made. 
While early definitions of coercion in a legal context centred on physical coercion, 
the legal definition of forced marriage has recently evolved to include emotional and 
psychological forms of coercion (FCO and Simmonds 2019). Affirmative models of 
consent, which are standard in UK law in the context of sexual coercion, go further: 
the defendant must prove that they acted to secure consent. According to Crown 
Prosecution Service (2020) guidance, ‘the defendant (A) has the responsibility to 
ensure that B consents to the sexual activity at the time in question’. However, the 
evidential burden was (arguably improperly) placed on the claimants to prove that 
they did not consent to the marriage or sexual act in question.
Of the cases examined in this study, sexual assault was alleged in 13 judgements. 
Furthermore, the evidential burden was not always underpinned by an affirmative 
concept of consent that is applied to sexual violence, albeit in criminal courts. All civil 
courts should apply the same standards: in this instance, they should draw upon the same 
definitions to establish whether marriage and/or sex acts were entered into by choice and 
whether the claimant was free to make this choice without coercion, deception or other 
impediments. At present, the relevant wording in the FMPO Act (section 63a) is ‘a 
person (A) is forced into a marriage if another person (B) forces A to enter into 
a marriage (whether with B or another person) without A’s free and full consent.’ If 
consent implies an active and conscious choice, then it follows that free and full consent 
should be ascertained before a marriage or sex act takes place, otherwise a civil court 
should hold that the marriage or sex act is entered into without consent.
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In four cases in which the victims themselves alleged that their marriages had been 
forced, three of their statements – both those given in court and earlier statements made 
to police – were not taken to be reliable evidence or were not carefully considered by the 
judges. In Re C (Female Genital Mutilation and Forced Marriage: Fact Finding) [2019] 
EWHC 3449 (Fam), a Thames-Valley-based Muslim woman of Kenyan/Somalian heri-
tage with a disability (‘C’) claimed that her marriage was forced, but the judge found that 
her marriage had been arranged. Before making this finding, the judge said she would 
consider the circumstances of C’s sisters’ marriages, as they were pertinent. One of C’s 
sisters (‘B’) had said in a police statement that she (B) had also been ‘persuaded’ to marry 
though she did not want to, but her mother kept ‘telling her’ to get married. However, in 
her oral evidence in court, B denied this. In relation to C (who was referred to as ‘the 
mother’ throughout the judgement), the judge ‘concluded that the mother’s marriage to 
the father was not forced as she claimed’, going on to say:
However, I was not satisfied that this was a love match entirely free from family influence as 
was suggested. Rather, this struck me as a consensual arranged marriage brokered initially by 
the maternal grandparents after they met the paternal family at the wedding of [another 
party] . . . That the mother’s marriage was arranged rather than forced fits more neatly with 
the evidence that the mother and father got to know each other on the telephone and met on 
a couple of occasions before the marriage ceremony.
In West Sussex County Council and another v F and others [2018] EWHC 1702 (Fam), the 
judge reflected on the grey area between arranged and forced marriage, but decided that 
the betrothal ceremony that took place in Pakistan involving a 13-year-old Muslim girl of 
Pakistani heritage (‘N’) and her cousin in his early 20s (‘B’) had been ‘consensual’. As the 
parents claimed that the girl was not to be married until 18, the judge expressed 
confidence that she would be able to refuse at that time if she decided not to proceed 
with the marriage. This was a complex case as the girl (and her siblings) were said by the 
judge to have exaggerated parts of those earlier/retracted statements. However, given that 
the children met the threshold for being taken into care, and the parents had taken the 
daughter in question out of education completely in Pakistan, it is interesting that the 
judge did not provide evidence for his satisfaction that the parents would respect the girl’s 
wishes in the future:
In terms of . . . the distinction between consensual arranged marriages and forced marriages 
involving serious human rights abuses this was far closer to the arranged marriage end of the 
spectrum but taking the form of a loose commitment not undertaken with N’s consent but not with 
the intention subsequently of her being forced to marry B whether she wanted to or not. The nature 
of the arrangement was such that had it endured to an age when she might legally have married 
I am satisfied she would have had a say and had she not wished it, it would not have proceeded.
This framing does not seem to consider the significant age difference between the girl and 
her cousin. Child marriages often involve large age discrepancies, with a recent Turkish 
study finding a mean age gap of 8.1 years between a child bride and her husband (Kuygun 
Karci et al. 2020). These marriages often impede the girl’s decision-making ability across 
many aspects of her life (Raj 2010, Falb et al. 2015, Kuygun Karci et al. 2020). There is 
also a higher risk of intimate partner violence in such relationships, and an association 
with negative reproductive and sexual health impacts (Falb et al. 2015). Furthermore, if 
a girl is betrothed in a public ceremony at an early age, this makes it difficult for her to 
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subsequently refuse to go ahead with the marriage because of the commitments already 
made by the families and the potential loss of face if the bride-to-be backs out (Kuygun 
Karci et al. 2020). In cases involving early betrothal, women are generally made to 
complete the marriage as soon as is practical (e.g. immediately after completing high 
school or turning 18), which gives them little opportunity to reconsider (see Gangoli 
2011,, Chantler 2012). Deception was used in six such cases in the sample, with families 
taking girls or young women away on the pretext of a holiday or a visit to see sick relatives 
only to then reveal the real purpose of the trip was marriage.
In terms of cases involving people with disabilities, AB v HT and others [2018] 
EWCOP 2 involved a London-based woman (‘M’) of Somalian heritage who had both 
a physical disability and a severe mental illness. She stated that she was forced into 
marrying her husband (‘MS’).
The judge accepted her aunt’s evidence that M’s father had said he would ‘make 
her’ get married. He also heard evidence regarding MS being concerned about his 
immigration status: according to Dr Shaikh, one of the witnesses for MS testified 
that while in a group of men, MS had asked if he could marry anyone’s daughter to 
address these worries, to which M’s father replied, ‘my daughter’. Meanwhile, the 
local authority argued that ‘Little, if any, consideration was given to M’s wishes and 
feelings.’ Similarly, the Official Solicitor, in their capacity as M’s litigation friend, 
stated:
A clear picture emerged indicating that AB [the father] wanted to arrange a marriage for 
M because he considered it to be culturally and religiously imperative. Her wishes as to the 
choice of a marital partner did not feature prominently in his thinking. M herself was not in 
any position to make much of an informed choice because she was only introduced to MS a few 
days before the wedding.
Nevertheless, the judge found that the marriage was not forced:
On a balance of probabilities, I accept HT’s [M’s aunt] evidence that on 15 August 2013 she 
told AB that M did not want to marry MS and that AB responded ‘I’ll make her’. There is, 
however, no evidence of any pressure being exerted on M and, in the light of my finding that it 
is impossible to discern M’s true wishes and feelings on that day, however, I do not find that AB 
did in fact force M to marry MS.
Taken together, the above examples show that marriages considered by judges to be 
arranged rather than forced included those where there was limited or no consultation 
with the bride-to-be, where the bride had no or limited opportunity to meet her future 
spouse and/or turn down the marriage, and those where the bride’s consent was not 
sought for the marriage. In four cases of forced marriage and one case of a betrothal 
ceremony, the brides/brides-to-be were vulnerable: they were either very young or had 
limited capacity/severe mental illness. In cases such as M’s, where a marriage has 
already taken place, in order to rule that the marriage was forced because of inability 
to consent, it must be proven that the bride did not have capacity at the time of the 
marriage (Mental Capacity Act 2005, s15.1; Mental Capacity Act 2005, s.13, 
Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, s.12;). This was difficult to prove in M’s case, despite 
her very low IQ and the fact that she was being involuntarily held in a mental hospital 
during the court proceedings. C also had ‘very significant learning disabilities’ and, 
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according to the psychologist who assessed her, ‘likely . . . met the DSM5 criteria for 
Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder, Depression and General Anxiety with panic attacks’ 
(CPS 2019).
Despite the law’s recognition of the role emotional pressure plays in consent versus 
coercion (Anitha and Gill 2009), formulations of consent in civil cases still seem to rely 
on a passive construction whereby the mere absence of an expression of dissent to 
marriage at the time of the wedding is deemed to indicate consent, even in the context 
of vulnerabilities and significant barriers (including learning disabilities, mental illness 
and deprivation of liberty) to expressing such dissent.
Cultural considerations
Culture emerged as another key theme in the cases. In common with previous research 
on forced marriage (Anitha and Gill 2014), our analysis demonstrates that culture was 
framed in a dichotomous manner, with non-Western cultures positioned as backward 
and traditional and Western ones as progressive and modern. While other studies have 
found similar framings in interview-based projects and analyses of UK Government 
policy (Anitha and Gill 2015, Enright 2009), this project is the first to analyse the way 
culture has been understood in FMPO proceedings.
Many judges were careful not to offend when discussing culture. However, subtle 
elements in their judgements showed that they viewed forced marriage as linked to 
culture through tradition. Family histories of forced marriage were seen to indicate 
a higher degree of risk, whereas love marriages in recent generations were viewed as 
mitigating risk. However, this arguably avoids assigning an appropriate level of serious-
ness to cases where parents who had a love marriage themselves sought a forced marriage 
for their child (e.g. because of perceived poor marriage prospects, perceived bad beha-
viour, coercive control or changes in the parents’ personal beliefs).
When tradition, culture and lack of choice are perceived as related, it is unsurprising 
that judges and respondents tend to make claims intended to signpost their professional 
status and/or allegiance to modern values, including metropolitan living and the impor-
tance of education. Such claims were used in several cases in the sample to deny that 
a forced marriage had taken part and/or portray even the possibility as implausible. For 
example, in London Borough of Camden and RZ and HZ and DZ and SZ, Neutral Citation 
Number: [2015] EWHC 3751 (Fam), involving male and female minors of Afghani 
background living in London, the judge made the following statement:
Finally in the context of it being alleged by the local authority that he intended to force his 
daughter into marriage the father has produced information regarding his family in 
Afghanistan, contending that he comes from a well-educated, metropolitan family for whom 
forced marriage would be an anathema. The father told the court that one of his sisters is 
a doctor, one is a teacher and one of his brothers is a retired senior army officer.
Meanwhile, in Re A and A, Case No: NE16C00241, involving female minors living in 
Newcastle but from a religious Kuwaiti background, counsel on behalf of the guardian 
drew a clear distinction between Kuwaiti and British culture, arguing for two teenage 
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girls to remain with their foster families in Britain rather than returning to Kuwait. His 
argument, which was referenced in the judgement, drew on the girls’ ‘integration’ into 
British society and their ‘rejection’ of Kuwaiti culture:
Mr Grey makes the point, on behalf of the Guardian, that the children have in fact rejected the 
culture and lifestyle afforded by their own family and both have embraced the alternative 
possibilities provided by foster care in the UK. These children are well integrated into their life 
in the UK [.]
In A Local Authority – and – (1) M (2) F (3) A, B, C, D, E, F, G (via their Children’s 
Guardian), Neutral Citation Number: [2018] EWHC 3295 (Fam), which involved male 
and female minors (all siblings) of Pakistani Muslim background (some with disabilities), 
the evidence of the father’s prior conviction for assaulting one of his daughters was raised 
in court. Care orders were sought for the eldest and placement orders for the younger 
children (E and F), all of whom lived in North West England. G, who resided in Pakistan, 
was already a ward of the court. When the older daughters were in their mid-teens they 
became concerned that their father would force them to marry cousins in Pakistan by 
their twenties: the judge ordered that existing FMPOs be continued. In relation to the 
assault, the sentencing remarks of the Honorary Recorder referred to the father bringing 
shame on his community:
You have brought shame on yourself, and you have brought shame on your community by the 
way in which you treated your daughter. You struck deliberately with a wooden spoon because 
she would not do her homework. She is 9. That is barbaric behaviour.
This reference to barbarity, which was echoed in the FMPO-related proceedings, is 
significant because, as Authors (2011) argue, when crimes such as forced marriage are 
viewed as ‘cultural’, the host nation is positioned as ‘liberal and neutral’ while the ‘othered 
society is essentialised as atavistic and illiberal’ (Anitha and Gill 2011, p.49; Razack 2004). 
Abji et al. (2019) refer to such framings as ‘culture talk’ in their exploration of how 
essentialising cultures in this way ‘reinforces the idea that certain cultures are barbaric’ 
(p.799) or more prone to encouraging acts of violence. This characterisation by the judge 
suggests that the father’s violence reflects on the standing of his community rather than 
just on him as an individual. Such collective attributions of shame are key aspects of the 
process of racialisation of minoritised people as bearing common moral attributes that all 
members of that group share. White offenders, as part of the normative category in 
postcolonial societies (Frankenberg 1993), are seen as offending because of individual 
pathologies rather than cultural (or gendered) reasons.
In two cases, one involving a Somali woman and the other a Bangladeshi woman, both 
with disabilities, an expert witness, Professor Rehman (who specialises in Islamic law), 
made the contentious argument that in Islam it is legally possible for a guardian to marry 
off someone underage or with a disability. The choice of expert witness has the potential 
to strongly influence the outcome of any proceedings. For example, in AB v HT and 
others [2018] EWCOP 2, the judge stated that
in light of the evidence of Prof. Rehman, I do not consider it necessary, appropriate or 
proportionate for this court to analyse further the lengthy allegations made on HT’s [the 
aunt’s] behalf concerning AB’s [the father’s] failure to address this issue [of whether the father 
should have sought to determine whether the daughter had capacity to consent to marry].
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These cultural considerations also extended to class. In most of the judgements involving 
applications for FMPOs to protect highly educated people, their educated families were 
framed as modern and therefore unlikely to coerce them into marriage. Asking to 
complete university education is the most common tactic used by young people who 
wish to avoid or delay marrying (Anitha and Gill 2011), but completing a degree does not 
necessarily mean a person will be able to successfully resist being compelled to marry. 
Markers of ‘modernity’ (e.g. high educational attainment, secular values and middle-class 
/professional status) are no guarantee that a family will not attempt to pursue a forced 
marriage (Gill and Gould 2020). ‘Modernity’ does not necessarily signify a decline in 
patriarchy and a respect for women’s rights: indeed, particular forms of violence against 
women, including forced marriage, have adapted to the modern context.
As demonstrated above, some judges and respondents equated modernity and 
progress with Britishness and the West, othering cultures where forced marriage is 
common. This risks assuming that ‘British ideals’ and traditions from the East/Global 
South are antithetical when, in practice, many immigrants successfully navigate dual 
identities on a day-to-day basis. However, as analysis of the judgements demon-
strates, the foregrounding of culture in forced marriage cases often elides these 
complexities in favour of a more simplistic and dichotomous framing (Anitha and 
Gill, 2011).
Disability, the right to marry, and constructions of capacity
Thirteen cases in the sample involved people with disabilities. However, in two of these 
cases, the disabled person was the mother or sister of the person to be protected by the 
FMPO (i.e. the claimant). Nine claimants had learning disabilities, four had mental 
illnesses, one had an acquired brain injury, one was profoundly deaf and another had 
an autism spectrum disorder; four had multiple disabilities. Their cases were often 
focused on the rights to marry and/or have sexual relations and the need to balance 
these rights with mental capacity and the right to be free from coercion in matters of 
marriage. Some of the cases outside the Court of Protection (mainly in the Family Court) 
also involved claimants, including children, and family members with learning 
disabilities.
Judgements in the five cases related to disability heard in the Court of Protection (and 
Family Division) mostly involved vulnerable adults who did not have the capacity to 
consent to marriage and/or sexual intercourse or who were found to be borderline in 
terms of their mental capacity. In previous research, including Gangoli et al. (2009), in 
researching early/child marriages in the UK, they found that both were more likely if the 
‘young person was not performing well educationally or professionally’ (Gangoli et al. 
2009, p. 423).
Women with disabilities experience much higher rates of sexual assault than 
women without disabilities – estimates range from over three times higher (Harris 
2018) to four times higher (McGilloway et al. 2020). The right to autonomy and 
a private life must therefore be balanced with arguments about protection from harm 
(Onstot 2019). People with disabilities may experience communication issues, which 
can make it more difficult for them to give consistent and linear accounts to police 
and in court. Moreover, McGilloway et al. (2020) found that people with disabilities 
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did not always have appropriate sexual education, which increased their vulnerability 
to sexual assault. Stereotypes concerning people with disabilities include ideas of 
them as ‘promiscuous’ (McGilloway et al. 2020) and as ‘sexual deviants’ (Onstot 
2019); these perceptions can, in turn, lead to increased victimisation. Harris (2018) 
describes the influence of what she termed ‘the aesthetics of disability’ – this was 
evident in some of the cases in the sample, where witnesses with disabilities were 
made to appear in court simply to demonstrate how their disability impaired their 
ability to consent. Mental illness can also affect how victims and at-risk persons are 
perceived by the police and courts. Women who engage in ‘risky behaviours’ or have 
‘behavioural health challenges’ (including substance abuse) are viewed as less credible 
(Morabito et al. 2019).
In the judgements, the gendered dimensions of forced marriage for people with disabil-
ities were complex. In four judgements, the need for disability-related care was recognised as 
one of the key motivations for marriage: Re RS (An Adult) (Capacity: Non recognition of 
Foreign Marriage) [2015] EWHC 3534 (Fam), The London Borough of Southwark v KA and 
others 2016 EWCOP 20, XCC v AA and others [2012] EWHC 2183 (COP), and AB v HT and 
others [2018] EWCOP 2. Two of these claimants were male and two female. In a fifth case 
(YLA v PM and another [2013] EWHC 4020 (COP)), the wife had significant care needs that 
her husband was meant to fulfil; however, the husband told his child’s foster parents that he 
felt ‘duped’ by the woman’s parents with regard to her disabilities, and the court decided that 
he could not provide effective care for his wife or their small child. The two cases involving 
women seeking FMPO-related relief reflected previous research findings that parents of men 
with disabilities regularly seek wives who will care for their sons, as women are far more 
often expected to fulfil caring roles than men (Clawson and Fyson 2017). Meanwhile, in the 
three cases involving husbands being found to provide care for women with disabilities, the 
men neglected their spouses and did not fulfil their anticipated caring roles (YLA v PM and 
another [2013] EWHC 4020 (COP); AB v HT and others [2018] EWCOP 2); these husbands 
had their own immigration-related motivations to marry, with both seeking to bolster their 
case for leave to remain after previous immigration appeals had been denied (AB v HT and 
others [2018] EWCOP 2; YLA v PM and another [2013] EWHC 4020 (COP)).
Marriages involving two women with severe intellectual disabilities who then became 
pregnant gave rise to concerns about the ability to understand and, thus, consent to sexual 
intercourse and/or to the ability to realise that sex can result in pregnancy and/or sexually 
transmitted infections (YLA v PM and another [2013] EWHC 4020 (COP)). Moreover, 
children born from marriages where the mother had severe disabilities resulted in involve-
ment with child protection services in three cases on the basis that the mother was at greater 
risk of physical and/or sexual violence from the father because of the significant power 
imbalance. In A Local Authority – and – (1) M (2) F (3) A, B, C, D, E, F, G (via their Children’s 
Guardian), the Children’s Guardian considered the mother to be at risk of domestic violence 
in light of her cognitive difficulties and believed that she may not have been able to adequately 
protect her children from harm in light of these risks. Meanwhile, two mothers with 
particularly severe disabilities also had difficulty performing childcare duties; for example, 
in YLA v PM and another [2013] EWHC 4020 (COP) the mother was unable to prepare 
feeding bottles or bathe her infant without significant support. In one case, this resulted in 
notifications for neglect (Re C (Female Genital Mutilation and Forced Marriage: Fact Finding) 
[2019] EWHC 3449 (Fam).
JOURNAL OF SOCIAL WELFARE AND FAMILY LAW 11
While people with disabilities have rights to privacy and to family life, they may be 
particularly vulnerable to forced marriage as a result of communication difficulties and 
a perceived lack of economic opportunities combined with the need to secure carers. 
Societal perceptions of people with disabilities can negatively affect how their witness 
testimonies are received in court, impacting their ability to convey their full needs for 
redress and protection.
Assessment of credibility regarding evidential inconsistencies
Two interrelated themes that emerged from the study concerned evidence and witness 
credibility. The kinds of evidence provided, and perceptions of that evidence, strongly 
influenced the outcomes of all the FMPO cases examined. In court, in order to seem 
reliable and coherent, narratives are expected to be consistent and linear. In this study, 
witnesses whose testimony was arguably unclear, fragmented and/or changeable were 
characterised as unreliable or untruthful in five cases. A more specific breakdown of these 
cases is detailed in the analyses below. In three of the cases explored in this study, the 
judges described four female witnesses as angry or hostile, even when anger was 
a reasonable response (i.e. in situations of neglect or abuse by a relative). In Tower 
Hamlets London Borough Council v BB and others [2011] EWHC 2853 (Fam), the aunt of 
a woman (‘BB’) with learning disabilities, schizophrenia and an acquired brain injury had 
removed the woman from her living situation with her husband, who was supposed to be 
acting as her carer but had been neglecting her needs. The judge found ‘it is undoubtedly 
the case that HT [the aunt] harbours strong feelings about the conduct of both AB [the 
father] and MS [the husband], and is a strong character who is not slow to express her 
views and feelings’. He concluded that ‘her [BB’s] wishes and feelings about her Islamic 
marriage to MS have been substantially influenced by others, in particular by HT [the 
aunt]’ and therefore he could not make the finding that the marriage had been conducted 
without consent. However, female witnesses may be damned if they do show emotion 
and damned if they don’t given that Kaufman et al. (2003) also found that unemotional 
female witnesses were regularly seen as lacking credibility.
In cases involving physical violence by family in the run-up to the forced marriage or by 
the husband following the marriage (as 19 of the judgements in this study did), the trauma 
that some witnesses had experienced may have affected how they recollected particular 
events. For example, trauma can fragment memory, and fragmented recollections are not 
conducive to forming the type of clear, linear narratives that courts generally require. 
Crespo and Fernández-Lansac (2015) found that trauma memories were ‘dominated by 
sensorial/perceptual and emotional details’ (p.149) such that coherence, organisation and 
fragmentation of traumatic memories is common. Indeed, fragmentation of memories in 
rape victims with PTSD has been linked to dissociation at the time of the assault (Herlihy 
and Turner 2015), while Salmond et al. (2011)found that children and adolescents pre-
senting at an emergency department who were subsequently diagnosed with acute stress 
disorder reported more trauma symptoms and presented more disorganised narratives. 
Research also shows that shame and posttraumatic avoidance affected both victims’ 
accounts and the ways in which disclosures were made (Herlihy and Turner 2015).
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A number of studies have shown that ‘impaired voluntary recall of the event’ (Crespo 
and Fernández-Lansac 2015, p.154) is central to PTSD, while another key diagnostic 
criterion concerns avoidance symptoms, which have been associated with shorter 
accounts of the traumatic event in multiple studies (Crespo and Fernández-Lansac 
2015). Short narratives can be viewed as evasive by judges, who described more detailed 
narratives as more credible or authentic in three cases. This accords with research on rape 
testimonies in courts in Norway, which found that words such as ‘detailed’, ‘nuanced’ 
and ‘neutral’ were used to describe testimonies that judges perceived as credible 
(Laugerud 2020).
Factors such as gender stereotypes and perceptions of people with disabilities 
also influence the perceived credibility of evidence and witnesses. For instance, in 
their analysis of the perceived credibility of asylum seekers and rape victims, 
Herlihy and Turner (2015) argued that rape myths impact all stages of the 
victim/survivor’s interaction with the judicial system as regards the way they and 
their claims are viewed. Perceptions of credibility are based on a combination of 
testifiers’ perceived trustworthiness and the plausibility of their accounts 
(Tuerkheimer 2017; Jones 2002/2019, Epstein and Goodman 2019). Tuerkheimer 
draws on the work of philosopher Karen Jones, who argues that ‘Testifiers who 
belong to “suspect” social groups, and who are bearers of strange tales can thus 
suffer a double disadvantage. They risk being doubly deauthorized as knowers on 
account of who they are and what they claim to know’ (Jones in Tuerkheimer 2017, 
p. 14). Credibility also comes into play in police decisions to pursue a case (O’Neal 
2019). Claimants are seen as more credible when they tell consistent narratives in 
different situations (e.g. in police reports and in court), especially when disclosure 
is prompt (Herlihy and Turner 2015).
Determining which accounts were most reliable was a complex matter for the judges 
in all the cases examined in this study as witnesses and respondents often gave conflicting 
accounts. As a result, many, but not all, judges provided a Lucas direction on reasons for 
lying; this direction acknowledges that witnesses might lie for many reasons and that one 
lie or inconsistency does not mean that all the person’s claims are false. In one judgement 
(Neutral Citation Number: [2018] EWHC 3295 (Fam), A Local Authority – and – (1) 
M (2) F (3) A, B, C, D, E, F, G (via their Children’s Guardian)), a trauma expert was 
quoted by the judge, which helped strengthen the idea that inconsistencies or confusion 
in evidence are not necessarily due to deliberate deception. In this particular judgement, 
Judge Parker of the High Court’s Family Division stated that
the expert said that the concept of a lie is an interesting one. Different narratives at different 
times can be caused by children’s anxiety. One should think about how memories are formed. 
When we remember, it is rarely perfect. We remember snapshots of a memory, and put bits in 
the middle to create the recollection. Traumatic memories are more prone to distortion, the 
reason for this is that when something difficult happens, our instinct is to block it out . . . What 
can also happen if we ask a child to recall memory again and again is that it can become 
tampered with as a result of retelling. Also, research tells us that if you have a memory, and 
someone tells you persistently that it is not true, that can make a child question the accuracy of 
the memory.
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This was one of the few instances in the judgements where there was explicit and 
sympathetic engagement with the impact of trauma on victims’ narratives. More com-
monly there were issues regarding how the evidence given by young or otherwise 
vulnerable witnesses was perceived. In some cases, minor inconsistencies meant that 
witnesses were treated as unreliable. This was particularly an issue in cases where women 
with disabilities alleged sexual assault. While the judges often considered minor incon-
sistencies (e.g. issues with counting and numeracy) as arising from severe learning 
disabilities, minor changes in accounts of sexual assault by the same witnesses in two 
cases were taken to mean the events had been fabricated. This is concerning given the 
often fragmented nature of traumatic event recollection. Combined with difficulties in 
remembering numbers and dates caused by learning disabilities, these issues meant that 
in five cases, the sexual assault testimonies of people with learning disabilities were 
discounted, used by the opposing counsel to undermine victim credibility or withdrawn.
In the case of a Thames Valley–based Muslim woman of Kenyan/Somalian back-
ground who had both a mental illness and a disability, Re C (Female Genital Mutilation 
and Forced Marriage: Fact Finding) [2019] EWHC 3449 (Fam), the judge did not accept 
that the woman had been raped by her husband, or that she had faced more than one 
incident of domestic violence, because of inconsistencies in the number of times she said 
she had been raped:
Given the mother’s [i.e., the woman alleging assault] difficulties with understanding numbers, 
I was less troubled by trivial numerical mistakes in the mother’s accounts as to how many 
times the couple had sex, but it did seem to me that there was a world of difference between an 
account claiming that each rape resulted in a pregnancy and one which said that there were 
more regular rapes. The inconsistency could not be explained away . . . There were also 
inconsistencies in the mother’s accounts of what had occurred during the alleged rapes and 
no account from her in her police interview that she had said to the father on each relevant 
occasion that she did not consent to sex with him (though she had earlier alleged she had tried 
to push the father off).
The judge claimed that he
had little doubt that this was not a marriage in which there was mutual sexual satisfaction. 
Within their sexual relationship, the father had no regard for the physical and psychological 
consequences of the FGM suffered by the mother and . . . detected little understanding of the 
emotional and psychological consequences for the mother of her alleged childhood rape. This 
careless disregard by the father was however a long way from habitual rape.
The judge found that ‘the father did not rape the mother’ and that her brother ‘did not 
sexually assault’ her. He expressed this in strong and definitive language. However, in 
other cases, the judges simply stated that there was not enough evidence, based on the 
balance of probabilities, to prove that the alleged events occurred. In a context where 
both perceptions of witness credibility and simplistic narratives – which involve ‘ideal’ or 
stereotypical victims and perpetrators – shape case outcomes, women with disabilities 
face particularly serious challenges in providing evidence that the court believes. This 
may be due to communication difficulties, but trauma-related memory problems of 
narrative linearity and/or consistency may also play a role, as might general perceptions 
of people with disabilities.
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Breaches of forced marriage protection orders
This final section examines the outcomes of FMPO proceedings in the 33 cases, including 
the orders made and any breaches of previous orders or any mention of potential 
breaches of these orders. Most of the cases involved concurrent proceedings and were 
not solely focussed on forced marriage, particularly in cases concerning minors. In cases 
where injunctions were made, the only ones with no concurrent proceedings were two 
cases involving requests for removing passport orders. Care orders, including interim 
care orders and wardship orders, were the most common orders imposed alongside 
FMPOs. In nine cases (i.e. almost half of those involving minors) the judges advised the 
LA to apply for care orders. The children in these cases were often taken into foster care, 
both because of the risk of forced marriage and because of other factors (e.g. physical 
abuse and domestic violence). Indeed, wardship orders were made in 12 cases involving 
minors, allowing the state to more easily remove minors from the care of parents who 
had previously taken them overseas for marriage purposes. In 12 other cases, the families 
were already known to social services before being subject to FMPOs: three of these were 
from Bangladeshi backgrounds, three from Pakistani backgrounds, one from an Afghani 
background, one from an unspecified ‘North African’ background, one from a Somalian 
background, one from a Kenyan and Somalian background, one from a British and 
Algerian background, and one from an unspecified ethnic background.
FMPO orders relating to mobility featured in 18 cases and included passport orders, 
port alerts or other mobility restrictions, such as a requirement that the person protected 
by the FMPO not leave the country. Another condition attached in nine cases was for the 
parents to either return the children in question to the UK, to not remove them from the 
UK in the first place or to endeavour not to take them to a named country. In the five 
Court of Protection cases, orders for capacity assessments and capacity declarations were 
the most common concurrent orders. Orders to institute marriage nullity proceedings or 
non-recognition declarations due to lack of capacity took place in two Court of 
Protection cases and two Family Division cases.
Exploring how breaches of FMPOs took place, and under what circumstances, facil-
itates a greater understanding of the effectiveness of FMPOs. In this study, seven 
potential breaches of FMPOs and one suspected breach of an FMPO were discussed in 
the judgements, and these breaches tended to occur in similar ways. Knowledge of these 
patterns can shape suitable changes that would strengthen existing legislation and 
procedural processes. Seven potential breaches of FMPOs and one suspected breach of 
an FMPO were discussed in the judgements. In three cases, breaches occurred when the 
family was living overseas or after the children had been removed from the UK, as once 
the people who had breached the FMPO had left the jurisdiction, they were less likely to 
be apprehended or subject to enforceable sanctions. The judges in these cases gave the 
respondents (most often the parents) opportunities (usually multiple opportunities) to 
respond to FMPOs. In two cases, parents were subsequently charged with contempt of 
court ([2011] EWCA Civ 555 Lydia Erhire – and – E O – I and Bedfordshire Police 
Constabulary v RU and another; [2013] EWHC 2350 (Fam)). In two other cases, parents 
were charged with breaches (Brighton and Hove City Council – and – The Chief 
Constable of Sussex – and MQ – and- FQ – and – CQ, DQ AND EQ [2018] EWHC 
3979 (Fam)). However, in the case of Re: K, the claimant subsequently retracted her 
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allegations, and prosecution was thus not pursued (Re K (forced marriage: passport 
order) 2020 EWCA Civ 190). In another case, the judge maintained that the parents were 
at risk of arrest for breaching an FMPO as a result of not returning their children to the 
UK by a stated deadline (West Sussex County Council and another v F and others [2018] 
EWHC 1702 (Fam)). In a further case, the father was in breach of an order associated 
with the FMPO to make his daughter available at the British Consulate in Jeddah (Amina 
Al- Jeffery and Mohammed Al-Jeffery [2016] EWHC 2151 (Fam)). When Amina – who 
was 21 at the time of the proceedings – was 16, she was told by her father to come to Saudi 
Arabia, where she alleged that she was physically abused and held captive. One police 
officer, whose evidence was discussed in the proceedings, stated that she believed people 
could circumvent port alerts issued as part of FMPOs. The judge responded that he had 
never seen any proof of this. However, within the sample of judgements, parents whose 
children were subject to care orders or FMPOs attempted to leave the country. Some who 
had dual nationality were able to travel on other passports and/or apply for passports 
from their country of origin for their children. In six cases where FMPOs were issued 
when parents were overseas, the parents seemed less concerned about breaches. This may 
have been because they could not easily be made subject to UK law when residing in 
another jurisdiction.
In the case of 1. A Chief Constable 2. AA and 1. YK 2. RB 3. ZS 4. SI 5. AK 6. MH Case 
No: LU09F03718, a marriage was contracted despite the court’s orders:
Despite the orders of the court, A [the person requiring protection under the FMPO] went 
through a form of marriage ceremony at the beginning of October 2009, but that marriage has 
not been formally registered, and it cannot be by virtue of prohibitive order of this court, which 
remain [sic] in force.
Religious marriage ceremonies, such as the one in this case, may be the most significant 
part of the marriage for some couples (Uddin 2018), as it helps cement links to culture, 
tradition and spirituality (Mustasaari and Vora 2020). Vora (2020) argues that possible 
motivations for nikaah-only marriages in the UK include male partners wanting to 
protect their assets in case of future marriage dissolution and/or young people wanting 
a ‘trial’ marriage that will still be viewed as valid within their religion and community – 
however, a minority may not realise that the nikaah-only marriage is not legally valid in 
the UK. Bone (2020) points out that a nikaah ceremony is not analogous to a civil 
marriage in the UK, as the practices developed from different traditions and hold 
different meanings, with the nikaah having both civil and religious implications. In 
many countries, religious and civil ceremonies are both accepted as valid (Uddin 
2018): this is not the case in the UK. Thus, in the UK, multiple studies of Sharia courts 
have found that 23–64% of Muslim marriages are not legally registered (Uddin 2018). 
The same is true in parts of Northern Africa, where only some marriages are legally 
registered after the religious ceremony has taken place. This is because a marriage that is 
not legal may still be seen as formalised by the community once a religious ceremony has 
been conducted. Therefore, the judge in the above case viewed the religious ceremony as 
a serious undertaking that contravened the original FMPO, even though it was not a legal 
marriage in terms of UK law.
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The case of Lydia Erhire – and – E O-I (by his next friend) was heard in the Court of 
Appeal, Civil Division, in 2011. The mother had been sentenced to eight months’ 
imprisonment for contempt of court regarding the breach of a wardship order. The 
son, who was 17 years old and in Nigeria after being taken there by his mother, was afraid 
that he had been taken there to be married and so applied for an FMPO, although he 
decided to delay serving it to his mother. She was ordered by the court to return her son 
from Nigeria to the UK; subsequent to this order, she told the court she was complying. 
However, she gave conflicting instructions to the school and to the boy’s aunt in Nigeria, 
telling them to ignore the court’s orders to take the boy to be put on a flight back to the 
UK. The court gave her multiple opportunities to return her son before deciding she was 
in breach of the order. The appeal court found that the sentence was not ‘dispropor-
tionate or excessive’ and the appeal was dismissed.
This body of evidence demonstrates that concerns about parents flouting FMPOs are 
not misguided. In six cases, evidence was provided to the court that parents had breached 
FMPOs and associated orders; moreover, breaches of co-existing orders, such as care 
orders, also took place on three occasions. It is worth considering the ways parents 
breached or attempted to circumvent orders: by ignoring FMPOs when overseas (Lydia 
Erhire – and – E O-I (by his next friend) and Brighton and Hove City Council – and – The 
Chief Constable of Sussex – and -MQ-and- FQ-and-CQ, DQ AND EQ), by taking children 
out of the country on other children’s passports (Re A (A Child) (Inherent Jurisdiction: 
Parens Patriae, FMPO and Passport Orders)), by applying for passports from another 
country where they were eligible for dual citizenship, by applying to the court to 
discharge passport orders to go abroad (West Sussex County Council and another v F 
and others [2018] EWHC 1702 (Fam)), and by claiming the ill health of grandparents 
(Bedfordshire Police Constabulary v RU and another) or a celebration that required taking 
the person protected under the FMPO abroad for family reasons.
Conclusion
This is the first research to examine judgements relating to FMPOs. As these orders 
were introduced relatively recently, it is important to understand how they function in 
practice. The study used a qualitative socio-legal approach to understand the applica-
tion and interpretation of the law and the broader socio-political context that shapes 
this process. Based on an analysis of the reasoning behind 33 FMPO-related judge-
ments, this paper contributes to understanding how framing narratives shaped the 
results of many cases.
In practice, FMPOs were imposed in many cases, especially to facilitate the return of 
(potential) victims of forced marriage from overseas and to prevent forced marriages 
from taking place in the UK. However, in other cases this form of protection was not 
accessible to applicants because of difficulties in securing the evidence required to prove 
that an FMPO was necessary. This is a particular issue in the civil context, as police may 
play a greater role in evidence gathering in criminal cases. Although it is easier to provide 
acceptable proof when subject to the probability standard (civil) rather than the criminal 
standard (beyond reasonable doubt), in many cases the judges set what seemed to be an 
unnecessarily high bar for proof. The term ‘probability’ is fraught in domestic and sexual 
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violence cases, as prevalent socio-cultural myths and stereotypes about gendered vio-
lence, consent/coercion, learning disabilities, physical disabilities and mental illnesses 
mean that victims are often not believed by either the public or the courts.
In the cases examined, FMPO proceedings often formed part of care proceedings in 
the Family Court. Domestic and sexual violence, and physical abuse of children, were 
commonly raised in the proceedings, but issues of inconsistency and apparent incoher-
ence often led to these claims being dismissed or largely disregarded. Narratives about 
severe violence, and multiple forms of co-occurring violence, were often disbelieved on 
the basis that they were seen as unlikely, even though people who experience violence 
have been shown to generally experience multiple types. Both disability and gender affect 
perceptions of victim credibility, while trauma and disability can also shape the process of 
narrative construction when giving evidence in ways that do not match legal expectations 
of full, linear and consistent accounts.
Meanwhile, legal constructions of coercion in FMPO proceedings still rely on 
a passive understanding whereby a lack of resistance implies consent. This places 
the onus on vulnerable victims to provide proof of coercion instead of on perpe-
trators to provide proof of consent, again bringing in issues of standards of proof 
in civil versus criminal proceedings. The concept of ‘affirmative’ or ‘active’ consent 
in relation to sexual activity could be usefully applied to forced marriage, shifting 
the focus from the victim’s resistance to marriage to the actions and words of the 
alleged perpetrators, demonstrating whether agreement to the marriage was sought 
and/or whether it could be obtained if the victim arguably lacked capacity to 
consent and/or understand any elements of what was involved.
Dominant constructions of Western versus ‘Othered’ cultures were another com-
plicating factor that influenced the application of the law. Lawyers representing 
respondents sought to position forced marriage as normal within the claimants’ 
cultures, while many judgements represented forced marriage as ‘backward’, ‘tradi-
tional’ or ‘cultural’ and positioned UK culture as liberal, modern and ‘neutral’ in 
contrast.
The study revealed a need to address the fact that orders were breached in 
a substantial minority of cases. As breaches tended to follow a handful of clear 
patterns – for example, parents ignoring FMPOs when abroad, using other pass-
ports or dual passports to take their children abroad, or travelling on the pretext 
of a family health emergency – procedural and legislative developments should be 
considered to address these breaches and ensure that all people can benefit from 
equal access to protection under the law. In particular, victims of forced marriage 
with disabilities experience significant barriers to justice, including inaccessible 
legal procedures, stereotypes that exclude or discount their testimony, problems 
accessing legal representation and protection, assumptions that they lack credibil-
ity, lack of accessible information and processes, and many more. Access to justice 
and equal recognition before the law are thus essential to preserving and advan-
cing the rights of people with disabilities, and special measures must be taken to 
support these individuals and enable them to voice their experiences in ways that 
are more likely to be viewed as credible. These measures include further training 
for judges and legal personnel on trauma and disability; training on the impact of 
trauma and disability on testimonies and witness behaviour; training that 
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dismantles prevalent socio-cultural myths and stereotypes about the role of culture 
and tradition in specific forms of violence and abuse; and a review of the model of 
consent versus coercion to explore whether ‘affirmative consent’ would be a more 
suitable standard in civil courts given that the burden of proof is lower in these 
proceedings.
Indeed, greater support should be provided so that all witnesses understand the kinds 
of evidence required in court and what sort of information will increase their perceived 
credibility (e.g. giving prompt reports to the police and identifying the specific dates and 
times of events). Meanwhile, judges must develop a stronger understanding of the range 
of coercive pressures in a family context that often result in conflicting testimonies and 
retractions of previous statements. Taken together, these measures can ensure that 
FMPOs are effective legal tools that protect all victims.
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